The Concepts of  Defective Condition  and  Unreasonably Dangerous  in Products Liability Law by Swartz, Mark A.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 66
Issue 2 Winter 1983 Article 2
The Concepts of "Defective Condition" and
"Unreasonably Dangerous" in Products Liability
Law
Mark A. Swartz
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Mark A. Swartz, The Concepts of "Defective Condition" and "Unreasonably Dangerous" in Products Liability Law, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 280
(1983).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol66/iss2/2
THE CONCEPTS OF "DEFECTIVE
CONDITION" AND "UNREASONABLY
DANGEROUS" IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW
MARK A. SWARTZ*
I. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN THE DIPPEL DECISION
Almost sixteen years after the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's decision in Dippel v. Sciano,' which adopted section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts2 dealing with
strict products liability, questions remain as to what ele-
ments must be proved to find liability for harm caused by a
product. Wisconsin's decision to abolish the requirement of
privity of contract in products liability cases came just four
years after California's abandonment of the warranty doc-
trine in the products area. The Dippel court held that "[flor
products liability cases we adopt the rule of strict liability in
tort as set forth in Sec. 402A of Restatement, 2 Torts
2d. . . ." The court then quoted the Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 402A verbatim:
Sec. 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for
Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
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1. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
3. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962).
4. 37 Wis. 2d at 459, 155 N.W.2d at 63.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.5
The Restatement section as quoted and adopted by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court did not, however, define two criti-
cal terms: "defective condition" and "unreasonably danger-
ous." Furthermore, the section as quoted did not offer
guidance to either the trial bench or the bar upon the ques-
tion of whether the term "unreasonably dangerous" was in
fact a synonym for defective condition or whether the defec-
tive condition was itself an additional element of proof.6
Although it was adopting section 402A verbatim, the
court in Dopel v. Sciano served notice that it was not specifi-
cally accepting or rejecting any of the comments to that sec-
tion.7 These comments, one might assume, would have shed
some light upon the issue of whether the plaintiff was re-
quired to prove both a defective condition and an unreason-
able danger to the consumer. As will be explained below,
express adoption of these comments would not have an-
swered the questions posed here. The Doppel v. Sciano deci-
sion did, however, list the elements which the plaintiff must
prove in a strict products liability case:
From a reading of the plain language of the rule, the
plaintiff must prove (1) that the product was in defective
condition when it left the possession or control of the seller,
5. Id.
6. Commentators have asserted that the inclusion of both defective condition and
unreasonably dangerous in section 402A was the unhappy consequence of the tinker-
ing which occurred in the process of revising section 402A, which had originally been
drafted to apply to products generally. See Smith, Status of the "Unreasonably Dan-
gerous" Element in Product Liability Actions, 15 FORUM 706 (1980) (general discus-
sion of strict tort liability for products); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liabilityfor
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
7. 37 Wis. 2d at 459, 155 N.W.2d at 63.
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(2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer, (3) that the defect was a cause (a substantial factor)
of the plaintiff's injuries or damages, (4) that the seller en-
gaged in the business of selling such product or, put nega-
tively, that this is not an isolated or infrequent transaction
not related to the principal business of the seller, and
(5) that the product was one which the seller expected to
and did reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition it was when he sold it.'
The requirement that the plaintiff prove both a defective
condition and that the product was unreasonably dangerous
was imported directly into paragraphs two and five of the
Wisconsin Jury Instruction - Civil 3260: "You must be sat-
isfied by the greater weight of credible evidence to a reason-
able certainty that: (1) the product was in defective
condition; (2) the defective condition made the product un-
reasonably dangerous to persons or property. . .."9
The definitions of defective condition and unreasonably
dangerous found in Jury Instruction 3260 were clearly de-
rived from comments g and i of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 402A:10
A product is said to be defective when it is not reason-
ably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such product
was sold and intended to be used. .... 1
A defective product is unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer when it is dangerous to an extent beyond
which would be contemplated by the ordinary user (con-
sumer) possessing the knowledge of the product's charac-
teristics which were common to the community.
1 2
II. APPROACHES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Wisconsin was not alone in adopting strict products lia-
bility by incorporating section 402A into its common law
without comment as to the nature and number of its ele-
ments, as if they were somehow self-evident. Illinois did the
8. Id. at 460, 155 N.W.2d at 63.
9. WIS. JURY INSTR. - CIVIL 3260 (1971).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments g & i (1965).
11. WIs. JURY INSTR. - CIVIL 3260 (1971).
12. Id.
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same in Suvada v. White Motor Co.,13 a case which was cited
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dippel v. Sciano.
A. The California Decisions
Nine years after its decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.,15 the California Supreme Court expressly re-
jected the two-element approach apparently required by the
language of section 402A and its comments. In Cronin v.
JB.E Olson Corp.,16 the California Supreme Court elected
to eliminate the element of unreasonable danger and pro-
vide for liability where the product was simply defective.' 7
The Cronin court decided that to require proof of an unrea-
sonable danger was, in effect, to submit the case to the jury
in a posture akin to that of a negligence case. The Cronin
court noted that:
Of particular concern is the susceptibility of Restatement
section 402A to a literal reading which would require the
finder of fact to conclude that the product is, first, defective
and, second, unreasonably dangerous .... A bifurcated
standard is of necessity more difficult to prove than a uni-
tary one. But merely proclaiming that the phrase "defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous" requires only a
single finding would not purge that phrase of its negligence
complexion. We think that a requirement that a plaintiff
also prove that the defect made the product "unreasonably
dangerous" places upon him a significantly increased bur-
den and represents a step backward in the area pioneered
by this court. 8
The committee notes to California's approved jury in-
structions, 19 which were revised in the wake of Cronin,
demonstrate the further difficulties created by a rejection of
the unreasonable danger element. Inasmuch as the Restate-
13. 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
14. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 456 n.8, 155 N.W.2d 55, 61 n.8.
15. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
16. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
17. It is interesting to note that the unreasonably dangerous element was re-
garded by the Cronin court as having "crept" into California after its inclusion in
§ 402A in 1965, two years after its decision in Greenman. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 129,
501 P.2d at 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
18. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
19. CAL. JURY INSTR. - CIVIL 9.00, at 288-89 (1977 Revision).
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ment defines defective condition in terms of unreasonable
danger, the Restatement itself is of little assistance in redefin-
ing strict products liability in relation to defect alone. The
committee notes state as follows:
The Restatement definition of a "defective condition" hav-
ing been disapproved in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.
.. . .the court goes on to say that the seller "should be
liable for all injuries proximately caused by any of its prod-
ucts which are adjudged 'defective.'" In a footnote to this
last statement, the court says, "We recognize, of course, the
difficulties inherent in giving content to the defectiveness
standard." Unfortunately the court eschewed the opportu-
nity to define either "defect" or "defective condition"
within the strict liability rule.
With no decisional or statutory guidance, the Commit-
tee is without definitive precedent by which to define either
"defect" or "defective condition."20
The California pattern jury instructions adopted subse-
quent to Cronin are paraphrased as follows: The manufac-
turer of a product is liable for injuries proximately caused by
a defect in design or manufacture which existed when the
article left its possession, provided that the injury resulted
from a use of the article that was reasonably foreseeable by
the manufacturer.2 1 A defect in the manufacture of a prod-
uct exists if the product differs from the manufacturer's in-
tended result or if the product differs from apparently
identical products from the same manufacturer.22
In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,23 the California
Supreme Court was confronted with a design defect case
wherein the trial court, in spite of the holding in Cronin, in-
structed the jury "that strict liability for a defect in design of
a product is based on a finding that the product was unrea-
sonably dangerous for its intended use .... -24 Although
the Barker court tacitly conceded that design defect cases are
more complex and thus distinguishable from manufacturing
defect cases, the above quoted instructions offered by the
20. Id.
21. Id. at 285.
22. CAL. JURY INSTR. - CIVIL 9.00.3, at 32-33 (West Supp. 1981).
23. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
24. Id. at 417, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (quoting Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972)).
[Vol. 66:280
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trial court were rejected. The Barker decision adopted a
dual standard for evaluating design defects: (1) an inquiry
into whether the product failed to perform safely in an envi-
ronment of intended use, and (2) an analysis of risk benefit.25
A shifting burden of proof was developed in Barker to avoid
imposing evidentiary burdens akin to those encountered by
plaintiffs in negligence cases. The Barker court noted that
"once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the in-
jury was proximately caused by the product's design, the
burden should appropriately shift to the defendant to prove,
in light of the relevant factors, that the product is not
defective. 26
The refusal in Barker to offer a specific definition of de-
fect was justified by the court on the ground that the myriad
of factual contexts confronted in the products liability area
would inevitably render a general single definition of defect
inappropriate. 27 The jury instruction committee in Califor-
nia composed the following special instructions to be given
in a design defect case from the general directions set forth
in the Barker decision:
A product is defective in design unless the benefits of
the design of the product as a whole outweigh the risk of
danger inherent in the design or if the product failed to
perform as safely as an ordinary consumer of the product
would expect when used in a manner reasonably foresee-
able by the defendant[s].
In determining whether the benefits of the design out-
weigh such risks you may consider, among other things, the
gravity of the danger posed by the design, the likelihood
that such danger would cause damage, the mechanical fea-
sibility of a safer alternate design at the time of manufac-
ture, the financial cost of an improved design, and the
adverse consequences to the product and the consumer that
would result from an alternate design.28
25. Id. at 418, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
26. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
27. Id. at 428-29, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal Rptr. at 235.
28. CAL. JURY INSTR. - CnvL 9.00.5, at 33-34 (West Supp. 1981).
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B. The "Not Reasonably Safe Test"
Several other jurisdictions which have been confronted
with the question of whether both defective condition and
unreasonable danger are elements of strict products liability
have been persuaded to adopt a single element approach.
Alaska appears to have followed the Cronin view in personal
injury cases29 but has retained the initial Restatement ap-
proach for property damage cases involving damage to the
product itself.30
Another jurisdicion which has rejected the bifurcated el-
ement view of the matter and embraced the unitary concept
of defect is New Jersey. In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Machine Co.31 the New Jersey Supreme Court deleted the
"defective condition - unreasonably dangerous" language
of section 402A as seemingly imposing an unwarranted bur-
den upon the plaintiff. The Suter court noted that:
[T]he jury should be charged in terms of whether the prod-
uct was reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended or
foreseeable purposes when inserted by the defendant into
the stream of commerce and, if not, whether as a result
damage or injury was incurred by the contemplated users
or others who might reasonably be expected to come in
contact with it .... There was no need to charge that the
plaintiff had to show that the equipment was in a defective
condition unreasonable dangerous to him. 2
The "not reasonably safe test" has also been adopted in
Washington and West Virginia3 3 and incorporated into the
New York pattern jury instructions.34 In Seattle-First Na-
29. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska
1975).
30. Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324
(Alaska 1981).
31. 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
32. Id. at _, 406 A.2d at 153. See also Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J.
229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981).
Commenting on Beshada, a failure-to-warn case, two writers conclude that in
New Jersey "'[diefective has now achieved a new meaning. It can be defined simply
as 'a product which causes injury.'" Platt & Platt, Moving from Strict to "Absolute'
Liability, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 17, 1983, at 15, col. 3. See also Birnbaum & Wrubel, NJ
High Court Blazes New Path in Holding a Manufacturer Liable, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 24,
1983, at 24, col. 1.
33. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975);
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 683 (W. Va. 1979).
34. N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTR. Supp. 2:141, at 109 (1979).
[Vol. 66:280
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tional Bank v. Tabert,35 the Washington Supreme Court re-
quired the plaintiff to prove that the product was not
reasonably safe and offered the plaintiff the option of prov-
ing that, in addition, the product was defective. The rejec-
tion of the requirement of proving a defect was based upon
the court's conclusion that many design cases present fact
situations wherein the term defect is totally inappropriate. 6
The New York pattern instructions, which have elimi-
nated the term "unreasonably dangerous," seem to smack of
the negligence focus which other jurisdictions have sought to
avoid. However, these pattern instructions do clearly convey
the concern of other courts and instruction committees that
the reasonable safety of the public is the true issue in prod-
ucts liability cases. The language of the instruction is illus-
trative of this emphasis:
A (manufacturer, wholesaler, . . .) who sells a product
in a defective condition is liable for injury which results
from use of the product when the product is utilized for its
ordinary purpose.
A product is defective if it is not reasonably safe - that
is, if the product is so likely to be harmful to (persons,
property) that a reasonably prudent person who had actual
knowledge of its harmful character would conclude that it
should not have been marketed in that condition. It is not
necessary to find that the (manufacturer, wholesaler, . .. )
had or should have had knowledge of the harmful charac-
ter of the product in order to determine that it is not rea-
sonably safe. It is sufficient that a reasonably prudent
person who did in fact know of its harmful character would
have concluded that the product should not have been
marketed in that condition.37
C. The Majority's Two-Element Test
Most courts that have been confronted with a request to
abandon the concept of unreasonable danger in strict prod-
ucts liability have not been persuaded to do so. The major-
ity view remains one of regarding the language of section
402A and its comments literally, so as to require proof of
35. 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
36. id. at -, 542 P.2d at 777.
37. N.Y. PArrERN JURY INSTR. Supp. 2:141, at 109 (1979).
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both a defect and unreasonable danger. Illinois, for exam-
ple, has stood by its original view of the matter in Suvada.38
Other courts have also retained the majority view on this
matter.39
Jurisdictions which have retained the requirement that
the plaintiff prove both defect and unreasonable danger but
which also recognize plaintiff's contributory negligence as a
defense to a strict products liability claim require, in effect,
that the plaintiff prove he was not contributorily negligent as
part of plaintiff's prima facie case. This difficulty is well il-
lustrated in the Montana case of Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods
Co.40 In Stenberg, the defendant manufacturer maintained
that it was not negligent as a matter of law because the un-
shielded intake end of a grain auger was visible to the user
and its danger must of necessity have been contemplated by
him. The Montana court conceded that the Restatement def-
inition of unreasonably dangerous, although adequate in sit-
uations where the condition is a latent one, should not be
given where the condition complained of is open and obvi-
38. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
39. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Vineyard v.
Empire Mach. Co., 119 Ariz. 502, 581 P.2d 1152 (1978); (California approach specifi-
cally rejected; concept of unreasonably dangerous regarded as a means of limiting
liability in cases of misuse and obvious danger); Potthoff v. Alms, 41 Colo. App. 51,
583 P.2d 309 (1978) (proof that product is unreasonably dangerous as well as defec-
tive is required for prima facie case); Marko v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 169 Conn. 550, 364
A.2d 217 (1975) (the elements of a strict liability case are clearly stated in the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)); Turney v. Ford Motor Co., 94 11.
App. 3d 678, 418 N.E.2d 1079 (1981) (distinct defect in product must subject plaintiff
to an unreasonable risk of harm); Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368
(1978); Robinson v. International Harvester Co., 44 II. App. 3d 439, 358 N.E.2d 317
(1976); Gilbert v. Stone City Constr. Co., 357 N.E.2d 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (plain-
tiff must prove injury because product was defective and unreasonably dangerous);
Chown v. USM Corp., 297 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 1980) (proof of unreasonable danger an
essential element under negligence and products liability theories); Aller v. Rodgers
Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Iowa 1978) (inclusion of the phrase "unrea-
sonably dangerous" does not inject negligence into a strict products liability case);
Daniels v. Albach Co., 365 So. 2d 898 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (both elements required to
sustain burden of proof); Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 176 Mont. 123, 576 P.2d 725
(1978) (Cronin specifically rejected); Thibault v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802,
395 A.2d 843 (1978); Spencer v. Nelson Sales Co., 620 P.2d 477 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980);
Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974) (Cronin rejected); Wy-
att v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 566 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977); Turner v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1979).
40. 176 Mont. 123, 576 P.2d 725 (1978).
[Vol. 66:280
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ous. 41 The Stenberg court went on to observe that the trial
court's instruction on the element of unreasonable danger
made it "virtually impossible for an open and obvious con-
dition to be unreasonably dangerous.'
42
In Aller v. Rodgers Machinery Manufacturing Co., 43 the
plaintiff-appellant contended on appeal that the element of
unreasonable danger and its definition "injects considera-
tions of contributory negligence into a strict liability case." 44
The Iowa court rejected this contention as follows:
This is not a fault of the present test. Under the present
test once a jury finds the ordinary buyer expected the
machine to be in the condition received, it must find the
plaintiff cannot recover on a theory of strict liability. Such
a jury could not tend to consider contributory negligence at
all.45
The inevitable result postulated by the Iowa court in Al-
ler is precisely the problem raised by the inclusion of the
element of unreasonable danger. The jury could conclude
that the product was defective, that is, not reasonably safe,
and yet conclude that because the danger threatened by the
unsafe product was apparent to the plaintiff, the product was
not unreasonably dangerous.
The jurisdictions which have retained the two element
approach to strict products liability have generally done so
out of a recognition that strict products liability must in
some instances be limited. These courts have regarded the
inclusion of the unreasonably dangerous element as a means
of limiting the liability of manufacturers and others in the
chain of distribution. The Byrns v. Riddell, Inc.46 case is an
example of this limiting approach. In that case, the Arizona
Supreme Court elected to retain the concept of unreasonably
dangerous because it was an effective means of limiting lia-
bility where the causal relationship appeared to be remote,
where the product may have been misused by the injured
41. Id. at , 576 P.2d at 730.
42. Id. at-, 576 P.2d at 730-3 1.
43. 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978).
44. Id. at 836.
45. Id.
46. 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976).
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party or where the duty to design should not be regarded as
encompassing all possible uses of the product.47
. The Wisconsin Approach
Certainly, a persuasive argument can be made in states
such as Wisconsin, which have permitted the comparative
negligence of the plaintiff to bar a products liability claim,
that the elimination of the element of unreasonable danger is
appropriate because the instruction on the comparative neg-
ligence of the plaintiff encompasses the limiting intent of the
unreasonably dangerous element but properly places the
burden of proof upon the defendant. There can be no doubt
that the current state of the case law in Wisconsin requires
that the plaintiff prove the elements of defect and unreason-
able danger as initially set forth in Dppel v. Sciano .48 It is
interesting to note, however, that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court was confronted with a request to eliminate the re-
quirement of proof of unreasonable danger as early as
1976.49
In Heldt v. Nicholson Manufacturing Co.,5° the plaintiff
sought a new trial "because the requirement in a products
liability case that the product be 'unreasonably dangerous'
ought to be eliminated."' 5' Noting that such issue had not
been raised in the trial court, the supreme court declined to
consider the issue on appeal. The court observed that the
trial court's instructions were consistent with the standards
previously adopted by it pertaining to products liability5 2
and that the unreasonably dangerous element contained in
the instructions had heretofore been regarded as an essential
element. 3 However, the court in Heldt went on to make the
following (apparently unnecessary) observation: "[W]hile
this court has not foreclosed itself from a reconsideration of
this question, the issue was not raised in the trial court, and
47. Id. at 1068.
48. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
49. Id.
50. 72 Wis. 2d 110, 240 N.W.2d 154 (1976).
51. Id. at 110, 240 N.W.2d at 154.
52. Id. at 113, 240 N.W.2d at 156.
53. Id. at 114, 240 N.W.2d at 156-57.
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we decline to consider an issue raised for the first time on
appeal. 54
In Black v. GeneralElectric Co.,55 the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals cited Heldt as authority for refusing to approve a
plaintiff's requested instruction which had substituted the
word "dangerous" for the term "unreasonably dangerous"
in the pattern jury instruction. 6 Whether the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has still not foreclosed itself from reconsid-
ering the issue in the seven years which have passed since its
decision in Heldt remains to be seen.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The author proposes that a change should be made by
the jury instruction committee with regard to the Wisconsin
Jury Instruction - Civil 3260.' 7 This change could be made
by the instruction committee without changing existing law.
The most glaring difficulty with Jury Instruction 3260 is
its definition of "defective": "A product is said to be defec-
tive when it is not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such product was sold and intended to be
used ... -. The problem here is in the use of the word
"fit." Fit has been defined as: "adapted or suited; . . . to be
adapted to or suitable for (a purpose, object, occasion,
etc.)."' 59 Is an unguarded saw fit (suitable) for cutting a two-
by-four? Of course it is. Is unodorized natural gas fit (suita-
ble) for cooking? Again, the answer is yes. The unguarded
saw cuts wood and unodorized gas burns and produces heat.
The list of similar examples is endless. The product in each
example cannot be regarded as defective within the above
quoted definition taken from Jury Instruction 3260. Hence,
the first required element of proof (required by the instruc-
tion itself and the cases) has not been met.
The fact that the term "fit" is modified by the adverb
"reasonably" is of no assistance. This combination of terms
appears to inquire only as to whether a rational person
54. Id. at 115, 240 N.W.2d at 157.
55. 89 Wis. 2d 195, 278 N.W.2d 224 (Ct. App. 1979).
56. Id. at 211, 278 N.W.2d at 230-31; WIs. JURY INSTR. - CIVIL 3620 (1971).
57. WIS. JURY INSTR. - Civil 3260 (1971).
58. Id.
59. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 537 (unabridged
ed. 1967).
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would regard the product as being suitable for or adaptable
to sawing wood or boiling water.
The fact that a product may be adapted to perform a spe-
cific task or be suitable to perform the required work does
not address, and in fact clouds, the true issue: whether a
product can reasonably be regarded as safe when used for its
intended purpose.
The term "safe" should be substituted for "fit" in the in-
struction. A defective product would therefore become one
which was not reasonably safe. An unguarded saw or
unodorized natural gas could then be regarded as defective.
The use of the term "reasonably safe" would further focus
the inquiry as to defect upon either a hypothetical manufac-
turer or the defendant specifically.
If the terms defective and unreasonably dangerous are
indeed synonomous as suggested in some of the cases, then
the jury instructions would at worst be telling the jury the
same thing twice. The fact that the inquiry into the existence
of a defect would now clearly focus upon the hypothetical
reasonable manufacturer and the further fact that the in-
quiry as to unreasonable danger is a consumer oriented stan-
dard leads this author to conclude that the required first and
second elements would remain intact in the revised
instruction.
More substantial changes in the instructions must await a
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision on the question of
whether to retain the concept of unreasonably dangerous as
a separate and distinct element of proof.
[Vol. 66:280
